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  We evaluate the presence of effects from joining one of four active labour market 
programs in Romania in the late 1990s compared to the no-program state.  Using rich follow-
up survey data and propensity score matching, we find that three programs (training and 
retraining, self-employment assistance, and employment and relocation services) had success 
in improving participants' economic outcomes and were cost-beneficial from society’s 
perspective.  In contrast, public employment was found detrimental for the employment 
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I. Introduction 
 
  Even though open unemployment was practically non-existent in Romania prior to 1989, 
with the introduction of social, political, and economic reforms, labour surplus soared.  The 
restructuring process affected many workers who saw the value of their human capital 
deteriorate, and struggled into finding new job or business opportunities.  The Romanian 
government soon recognized the urgency of developing social safety programs and active labour 
market programs (ALMPs hereafter) to help the unemployed during this transition period.  Thus, 
in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection combined social insurance and 
means-tested income support with active policies aimed at increasing labor demand for youths, 
improving matching by providing retraining for unemployed individuals, and stimulating job 
creation through credits to businesses.  However, the extent of these active programs remained 
limited, as discussed in Earle and Pauna, 1998.  And it is not until the late 1990s that the 
Romanian government launched the real start of active programs on a significant scale by 
signing a loan agreement with the World Bank.   
 
  In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of four active labor market 
programs that were implemented through this agreement in Romania at the end of the 1990s.  
These programs were: (1) training and retraining (TR), (2) self-employment assistance (SE), (3) 
public employment (PE), and (4) employment and relocation services (ER).  The objective of the 
evaluation was to inform the Romanian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection and the 
National Agency for Employment and Vocational Training on the impacts of these programs 
on the employment experiences and earnings prospects of its participants as compared to the 
outcome if the individual had continued to search for a job as openly unemployed, that is, not 
participating in any of the ALMPs under evaluation.  We also considered program costs and 
provide information as to whether the programs were cost-effective.  The focus is on the direct 
effects of the programs; no attempt is made to assess the general equilibrium implications.
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    Therefore, this study’s contribution to the Romanian and the international literature is 
threefold.  First, by providing an evaluation of the effects of four ALMPs implemented in 
Romania in the late 1990s, this paper increases our knowledge on what experiences work in 
transition economies.  Second, we argue that our data is unusually rich for studies conducted 
in transition economies, which allows us to address the selection issues in a reasonable way.  
Third, we explore the net social benefits of those ALMPs found effective. 
 
Our analysis is based on a follow-up survey specifically designed and collected for this 
evaluation.  The most important reasons for using survey data instead of administrative data 
were that the former provided us with good quality data on key variables—such as earnings 
for both the employed and the self-employed, and allowed us to track individuals’ earnings 
and employment status at different points in time over a four-year period.  The data, a random 
sample of close to 4,000 persons who registered at the Employment Bureau during 1999, was 
collected during January and February 2002.  Thus, we observe individuals at least 24 months 
                                                 
1 For a theoretical macroeconomic framework for studying both the direct and indirect effects, see Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman (1991), among others.  
after the programs started. About half of this sample (2,047 persons) were ALMP participants 
whose ALMP contract began in 1999.  The other half did not participate in any of the four 
ALMPs under analysis. 
 
  We base our analysis on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), and use a kernel-
based matching estimator to estimate the average treatment effect.  A part of the paper is devoted 
to discussing the plausibility of the CIA in this context.  One of the biggest challenges when 
evaluating ALMPs in transition economies is the quality and quantity of data—see Kluve, 
Lehmann and Schmidt, 1999, or Earle and Pauna, 1996, among others, for discussion on the poor 
quality of ALMPs’ data in transition economies.  We argue that our data contains important 
baseline information—in particular, pre-treatment earnings, employment history and experience 
information—making the CIA assumption more plausible.  
 
    Our analysis of program impacts reveals that three of the four programs (TR, SE and ER) 
had success in improving participants' economic outcomes and were cost-beneficial from 
society’s perspective.  We find that ER succeeded in increasing the likelihood of participants’ 
employment and their earnings, and reducing the likelihood of receiving unemployment 
benefits.  We also find that SE improved its participants’ employment prospects, although it 
did not have a significant impact on their earnings; and that TR increased the earnings of its 
participants and reduced the likelihood of receiving unemployment benefits.  In contrast, our 
analysis reveals that PE was found detrimental for the employment prospects of its 
participants.   
 
    While the literature on evaluations of ALMPs in developed market economies is vast, the 
evidence on transition countries is scarcer.
2  Recently, several studies have studied the 
effectiveness of ALPMs in transition economies, like Bosnia and Herzegovina (Benus, Rude, 
and Patrabansh, 2001), Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and Dorenbos, 2001), Czech 
Republic (Boeri and Burda, 1996, Terrell and Sorm, 1999), Hungary (Gill and Dar, 1995, 
O’Leary 1995, O’Leary, 1998a, and O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar, 1998), Macedonia 
(World Bank, 2002), Poland (Kluve, Schmidt and Lehmann, 1999, Kluve Lehman and 
Schmidt, 2002, Puhani 1998, O’Leary, 1998b, and O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar, 1998), 
Slovak Republic (Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999), Slovenia (Vodopivec, 1999), and Ukraine 
(Kupets, 2000).  Overall, our results are consistent with earlier findings, as discussed in our 
findings section, section VI.
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    This paper is organized as follows.  The next two sections present background information 
on Romanian labor market development, and the set up of the ALMPs under evaluation. 
Section four describes the data, sample selection and displays the descriptive statistics.   
                                                 
2  See Katz, 1994, Fay, 1996, Martin, 1998, Dar and Tzannatos, 1999, and Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar, 2004, 
for good reviews of the literature. 
3 Many rigorous evaluations have also studied the impact of ALMPs in East Germany, as illustrated by Eichler 
and Lechner, 2000, Fitzenberger, 2000, Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner, 1999, Lechner, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 
2000, and Hujer and Wellner, 2000, among others.  Despite their interest, we limit our comparison of results to 
evaluations conducted in transition economies.  We therefore do not discuss results from East Germany because 
of the extremely unique process this country experienced.    
Section five discusses the economic evaluation strategy and the empirical implementation.  
Section six displays the results.  Section seven discusses heterogeneity among individuals and 
sensitivity analyses.  Section eight concludes with the cost-benefit analysis. 
  
 
II.  The Economic Context 
 
    Romania’s transition to a market economy has been slow and painful partly as a result of 
its stop-and-go approach to the restructuring process.  Since the 1989 Revolution, successive 
governments have adopted a cautious approach to market-oriented reforms.  This slow pace of 
reform—relative to some of its neighbours in Central Europe—delayed needed structural 
changes and added greater difficulties to the already unfavourable set of initial conditions 
inherited from the previous regime.   
 
  As shown in Figure 1, after an initial economic contraction in the early 1990s due to the 
increase of external competition and the abolition of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), Romania experienced a partial economic recovery beginning in 1992, similar to the 
one observed in leading transition economies in Central Europe.  However, in contrast with these 
leading economies, Romania lived a second period of economic decline beginning in 1996, 
which was mainly caused by the lack of enterprise restructuring.  In the second half of 1996, 
Romania’s authorities took a series of decisions with the aim of accelerating the privatization, 
restructuring and liquidation of unprofitable business.  However, the recovery was slow and did 
not produced significant economic results until the year 2000.  Since then the Romania economy 
has grown at an average of 4 or 5 per cent per year. 
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  The collapse in output at the beginning of the 1990s prompted an increase in unemployment. 
As shown in Figure 1, following the drop in output, registered unemployment soared and  
reached over 10 percent of the labor force in 1994.  The unemployment rate then fell temporarily 
during 1995 and 1996, only to rise rapidly thereafter reaching 11.5 percent in 1999.  Since then, 
the registered unemployment rate has fallen gradually to 9 percent of the labor force in 2001.   
 
  Data on registered unemployment in Romania understate the real problem with dislocated 
workers for at least the following three reasons. First, during the 1990s the increase in open 
unemployment was contained by Romania’s policy approach of limiting job destruction by 
adjusting through real wages, combined with a series of early retirement programs. Even though 
these two policies succeeded in limiting the increase in registered unemployment, it pushed 
workers out of the labor force and into low productivity jobs, primarily in agriculture.  Second, a 
high share of Romania’s employment is in subsistence agriculture—the share of agricultural 
employment in Romania in 2001 was 42 percent of total employment (up from 28 percent of 
total employment in 1989).  This suggests the existence of a two-tier system consisting of a large 
number of people involved in low productivity jobs and subsistence agriculture coexisting with 
large, potentially profitable but unreformed, farms.  And third, the existence of borderline 
employment categories to measure employment in Romania substantially influences key 
indicators of labor market performance and suggest that many individuals in Romania are ready 
to work but that the limited opportunities prevent them from doing so.
4  
 
   
III.  Labour Market Programs 
 
  Even though open unemployment was practically non-existent in Romania prior to 1989, 
with the introduction of social, political, and economic reforms, the emergence of labor surplus 
soared.  The Romanian government soon recognized the urgency of developing programs to help 
the unemployed during this transition period.  Thus, as early as 1991, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection adopted the Romanian Unemployment Program.  This program was not a pure 
social insurance program since it contained provisions for means-testing.
5  According to this 
program, unemployed individuals were eligible for financial support through unemployment 
benefits, allowance for vocational integration, and support allowance.   The conditions to be 
eligible were the following: to be registered at the local Labor Office, to be aged eighteen and 
over, to have an income less than half of the indexed national minimum wage, to be unemployed 
due to liquidation or a lay-off, and to have been employed at least six months during the last 
twelve months, or recent graduate from school or university unable to find suitable employment.  
Unemployment benefits were paid for a maximum duration of nine months.  The level of these 
benefits ranged from 50 to 60 percent of the average monthly salary during the last three months 
of employment for laid-off workers.  For new entrants, allowances for vocational integration 
                                                 
4 Examples of borderline employment categories include unpaid family helpers, involuntary part-timers, or people in 
“technical” unemployment or unpaid leave initiated by the employer.  
5 It contained two means-testing elements: a ceiling on land ownership, and a ceiling on personal income of half 
the minimum wage.  However, according to officials from the Ministry of Labor and from local offices the 
ceiling on land ownership was seldomly binding as the inefficiency and corruption of the process of  land 
privatization lead to many new owners without titles, making it difficult to prove that the land was theirs, even 
though they may work it unofficially. In practice, the only consequences of the ceiling on personal income were 
a reduction in reported income.  
varied by the level of education and years of experience for those with prior work experience.  
After exhausting unemployment benefits, those who remained unemployed received a support 
allowance (of 60 percent of the indexed minimum wage) for a maximum period of 18 months.
6   
 
  In the early 1990s, Romania also adopted several active policies aimed at increasing labor 
demand for youths, improving matching by providing retraining for many categories of 
unemployed individuals, and stimulating job creation through credits to businesses.
7  However, 
the extent of these active programs remained limited, as discussed in Earle and Pauna, 1998.  
Thus, the need for additional and more diversified measures enabling to support employment 
emerged progressively and became particularly urgent after 1996-1997 when privatization and 
the restructuring accelerated and resulted in massive layoffs. 
 
  In the late 1990s, the Romanian government launched the real start of active programs on a 
significant scale by signing a loan agreement with the World Bank.  The focus of the present 
paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the four ALMPs implemented under this agreement: (1) 
training and retraining (TR), (2) small business assistance (SE), (3) public employment (PE), and 
(4) employment and relocation services (ER).   
 
 
Implementation of ALMPs 
 
  Implementation of ALMPs began in 1997 by the National Agency for Employment and 
Vocational Training and the county agencies for Employment and Vocational Training.   
County level Agencies for Employment and Vocational Training designed and implemented 
Active Labor Measures for displaced workers.  However, these services were not provided by 
the county agencies themselves, but were contracted out to public or private service providers.  
The county agencies were responsible for the public announcements of the tenders, 
conducting the tendering process, and contracting out the ALMPs.   
 
  Contracts to service providers were awarded with built-in incentives to improve labor market 
impact such as negotiated levels of job placement and business start-up, with financial incentives 
to meet objectives and disincentives if objectives were not met.  Thus, service providers were 
likely to select those unemployed individuals most likely to succeed in completing their program 
and accessing employment.  As we shall see in section IV, this will cause selection bias due to a 
correlation of individual program participation with the outcomes under investigation.   
 
 
Description of the Programmes 
 
                                                 
6 See Earle and Pauna (1998) for a detailed description and thourough analysis of the unemployment benefit and 
support allowance program in Romania. 
7 The first active measure to be adopted was training and retraining for the unemployed in 1991.  Then in 1992, 
an important youth measure was initiated through the labor offices, the Wage Subsidy Program for New 
Graduates.  In 1995, a program offering loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises that hired at least 50 
percent of the new hires from the unemployment pool was also launched.    
  The four programmes were clearly differentiated as evident from the description of their 
key characteristics presented in Table 1.  While SE and ER offered services aiming to 
facilitate business start-ups for displaced entrepreneurs (the former), and job placement for 
recently unemployed workers (the latter), the other two programs were targeted to more 
difficult populations.  TR offered vocational training, general education and literacy skills to 
those who lacked these basic skills or needed to learn new marketable ones. While PE was 
frequently considered as fully subsidised labour, and was mainly offered in those regions with 
the least economic opportunities. 
 
  The maximum length of these programs also varied, and ranged between six months—for 
public service employment, and a year—for employment and relocation services. However, in 
practice, the length was considerably shorter than the established maximum duration.   
Participation in TR, PE, and ER increased the period in which individuals could receive 
benefits by the length of the program (in the case of TR and PE), and by a maximum of two 
months in the case of ER, adding an incentive for certain individuals to participate in the 
programs. 
 
  The requirements to service providers are key to understanding how the selection into the 
different programmes was done.  In all programs, service providers had to agreed to a 
minimum negotiated job placement rate of an average of its participants.  This rate was the 
lowest for SE programs, which had to agree to a negotiated business start-up rate of at least 5 
percent of clients initially contacted, and highest for TR services, in which case local 
organizations proposing training programs had to show evidence of demand for trained 
workers and agree to a minimum negotiated job placement rate of an average of at least 60 
percent. For the other two types of services, PW and ER, providers had to agree to negotiated 
job placement rates of at least 10 percent at the end of the program. 
 
  In addition, service providers had to demonstrate minimum capabilities to be service 
providers, such as staff qualifications, facilities, financial viability, and placement capability, 
and they had to agree certain provisions on eligible costs, and limits to reimbursement per 
service, as described in Table 2. 
 
  Finally, there were some requisites that prevented duplication of payment and services.  
First, individual clients could not receive income support payments (e.g., minimum wage 
during TR or PE) if they were receiving other types of state financed income support, such as 
unemployment benefits.  Second, individuals could not participate in both TR and PE.  And 
third, individuals were not allowed to participate more than once in a programme in a period 
of 24 months. 
 
 
Utilization of ALMPs   
 
  As indicated in Table 3, among these four ALMPs, there were 767 contracts completed as of 
September 1, 2001, and over sixty-four thousand clients served.  The overall placement rate 
among these contracts varied largely by program—ranging from 41% for TR to 13% for PE.   
The program with the largest number of clients (ER) provided assistance to 31,679 
individuals at an average cost of only 123.74 thousand lei per client (about 12US$ per client).  
In contrast, the PE served a much smaller number of clients (9,496); the cost per client for this 
program was 2,915.77 thousand lei per client (about US$294 per client).
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  Based on discussions with program implementation staff, we determined that contracts 
that begun in 1999 most accurately reflect the operations of the ALMPs.  Prior to 1999, the 
ALMPs were new and some of the procedures were not fully implemented.  Contracts that 
begun after 1999 may not be suitable for the evaluation since some may still be in operation 
or recently finished at the time of the survey and impacts from these contracts may not yet be 
fully reflected in participants’ outcomes.  Thus, our sample was drawn from contracts that 
started during 1999.   
  
 




This study uses data from a follow-up survey of registered unemployed specifically 
designed for this evaluation.
9  We shied away from using existing data from the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Protection  for several reasons.  First, we were concerned on the quantity 
and quality of the existing data.  But, more importantly, data from the Ministry lacked several 




Compared with existing data from the Ministry, our follow-up survey data provided 
much more detailed characteristics of the unemployed individuals, and observed their earnings 
and employment status at different points in time over a four-year period.  Moreover, since 
official data is collected in the local labor offices, we were concerned that respondents would be 
more reluctant to fully disclose their earnings to public authorities (as part of tax avoidance 
strategy) than to trained interviewers from an outside independent agency.
11   
 
For these reasons, we contracted with a Romanian private survey firm, Institute of 
Marketing and Polls (IMAS), to conduct field surveys during January-February 2002.  The study 
goal was to achieve over 4,000 respondents.  Of the 5,735 individuals contacted for interviewing, 
about 70 percent responded.  As is common in these type of studies, response rate was slightly 
higher for participants (72 percent) than for non-participants (68 percent).   
                                                 
8 All costs figures have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
9 Survey data of registered unemployed specifically collected for a study was used in Earle and Pauna, 1996 and 
Earle and Pauna, 1998. 
10 The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection provides some aggregate classifications on the unenmployed each 
month.  These data, although useful, are limited to a few basic dimensions and allow few inferences concerning 
the origins, causes, and incidence of unemployment to be drawn. 
11 Previous studies have found evidence of this.  For instance, O’Leary et al., 1998, found evidence that 
participants of self-employment assistance programs in Hungary could have been under-reporting earnings to 





The data used in this study, a random sample of approximately 3,996 persons who 
registered at the Employment Bureau during 1999, was collected during January and February 
2002.  About half of this sample, 2,047 persons, were ALMP participants whose ALMP 
contract began in 1999.  The other half did not participate in any of the four ALMPs under 
analysis. 
 
  To obtain a representative sample of ALMP participants, we randomly selected, for each 
of the four ALMPs, 10% of clients served in the fifteen counties with the largest number of 
clients served in 1999.
12  These fifteen counties (judets) represented 86% of all clients served 
in 1999, and a broad spectrum of the Romanian economy with many sectors represented, 
including heavy industry, mining, and agriculture, among others.  Moreover, these fifteen 
judets included some of the poorest judets in Romania (Botosoni and Vaslui  -- north-east 
region) as well as some judets with substantial natural resources and highly developed 
industries (Cluj and Maramures -- north-west region).  
 
  The other half of the sample—the potential comparison group—were 1,949 persons who 
were registered at the Employment Bureau around the same time and in the same county than 
participants but who had not participated in an ALMP.  To select non-participants, we first 
determined, for each of the four ALMPs, the number of participants that were selected for the 
participant sample in each of the judets.  Next, in each county and for each ALMP, we 
randomly selected an equal number of non-participants from the same Employment Bureau 
register list. 
 
  The timing of events, shown in Figure 2, goes as follows.  Some of the workers registered 
at the Employment Bureau during 1999 received services from one of the four ALMPs 
described above.  The rest of the workers did not receive any of these services.  Although it is 
possible that some of the program participants may have continued to receive services during 
the year 2000 (since the maximum duration of the ALMPs varied between 6 and 12 months), 
it is quite unlikely since, in practice, the length of these programs was considerably shorter.  
During January and February of 2002, we interviewed the selected sample of participants and 
non-participants.  All interviewed persons were asked three types of questions: (1) questions 
on employment and earnings at the time of the survey, (2) retrospective questions on 
employment and earnings during the years 2000 and 2001, and (3) retrospective questions on 
employment and earnings during 1998, prior to participating in the ALMPs.  Details regarding 
the outcome variables are given in Section VI. 
 
Restriction that all data be available led to a sample of 3,396 individuals (1,627 
participants and 1,501 non-participants).  All the results presented below are robust to using 
                                                 
12 Because of the low number of participants in the TR, we used a higher sampling rate (25% of clients served) 
for this program.  
all of the observations available for each of the different outcome variables.  However, in 





TIMING OF EVENTS 
 




Some participated in 
ALMP, some did not. 
Workers worked or looked for employment.  
During 2000, some of the ALMP participants may 
have continued to receive services. 





  Tables 4 and 5 display descriptive statistics for socio-economic variables for the 
different subsamples that are defined by treatment status.  The descriptive statistics conform 
to our expectations that different types of displaced workers participated in the different 
ALMPs.  The results are summarized below. 
 
Clearly, participants in PE are the most disadvantaged among the unemployed both in 
terms of level of education and employment history.  They are the least educated, with one 
fifth of them having only primary school education.  And they have the worse employment 
prospects since almost two thirds of them were not employed in 1998, and their average 
unemployment spell in 1998 was 9 months.  Moreover, these participants are also the most 
likely to live in rural or small urban areas with high unemployment.  This is in line with the 
idea that public employment is considered fully subsidised labor, and that it is offered mainly 
in those regions with the least economic opportunities.   
 
On the other hand, participants in TR are the youngest among the four ALMPs with an 
average age of 39.1 years old and less than one fifth older than 45 years old.  This is 
consistent with the idea that substantive human capital investments are more beneficial the 
longer the productive period of the recipients.  However, the fact that participants in TR 
appear to have the highest predisposition for training with almost one fifth of this group 
participating in training in 1998, combined with their young age, low education level—almost 
70 percent of them did not have a high-school degree in 1998, and poor employment 
perspective—as more than two fifths reported being unemployed in 1998, seems to suggest 
that this group consists of young workers with low education achievement and poor market-
valued skills who have difficulties entering the labor market.
13 
                                                 
13 Even though this group of participants have similar work experience than the other groups, we must remind 
the reader that a large number of people in Romania are involved in low productivity jobs, subsistence 
agriculture, and borderline employment that make their skills not necessarily valued in the profitable market—
see section II.   
 
In contrast, participants in SE and in ER have relatively more stable employment 
history during 1998 than participants of the other two ALMPs, as three fourths reported 
working during 1998.  There are, however, clear differences between these two groups. 
While, participants in SE tend to be more educated with two fifths of them holding a high-
school degree and one fifth of them holding a university degree, participants in ER are more 
likely to live in large urban areas. 
 
Non-participants resemble the most to participants in ER and SE.  However, they 
experienced considerably more stable and better paid employment during 1998.  For example, 
two thirds of them were employed between 9 and 12 months in 1998.  Moreover, with the 
exception of participants in public employment, which are predominantly males, non-
participants have a higher share of men in their group. 
 
 
V.  Identification and Estimation 
 
The Evaluation Problem 
 
The evidence in the previous two sections shows that the ALMPs offered were 
considerably different and targeted to individuals with different skills and labour market 
experiences.  Thus, we focus our analysis on comparing the outcomes of two alternative 
strategies available to displaced workers: to participate in a particular ALMP, or to continue 




 Let  Y
t denote the outcome when a person gets the treatment (in this case, participates in 
one of the four ALMPs described above), and Y
c denote the outcome when a person does not 
participate in any of the ALMPs described above.  Let D denote a binary assignment indicator 
that determines whether the individual gets the treatment (D=1) or not (D=0).  
 






c|D=1)    (1) 
 
The shorthand notation E(.|D=1) denotes the mean in the population of all individuals who 
participate in an ALMP, denoted by D=1.  
 
ATET shows the expected effect of the program for those persons who actually 
participated.  However, we cannot observe the counterfactual, E(Y
c|D=1), i.e., the average 
outcome of those persons who participated in the program had they not participated. Thus, 
without further assumptions, ATETs are not identified.  But if we can observe all factors that 
                                                 
14 We considered basing our analysis on the “multiple treatments” model.  However, the large socio-economic 
differences across the different treatments combined with the relative modest samples, lead to large losses of 
observations due to the common support requirement, and poor matching.    
jointly influence outcomes and participation decision, then—conditional on those factors (call 
them X), the participation decision and the outcomes are independent.  This property is 
exploited by the conditional independence assumption (CIA). 
 
Is it Plausible to Assume Conditional Independence?  
 
Our approach for meeting the CIA was to include in the matching process: (1) 
characteristics influencing the decision to participate in ALMP, (2) baseline values of the 
outcomes of interest, (3) variables influencing the outcomes of interest, and (4) variables 
reflecting local labour market conditions, and regional differences in program implementation 
or local offices’ placement policies.  
 
The characteristics, implementation, and utilization of the different ALMPs as well as the 
characteristics of their participants indicates that the level of education, experience, previous 
earnings, and pre-program unemployment history are important factors in determining whether 
an individual will participate in any program, as well as in which of the programs.  These factors 
are also likely to influence the future labour market outcomes, and thus, in order for CIA to be 
plausible, they should be included in the estimation of the propensities. 
  
Demographic characteristics, such as age and gender are also important determinants 
of labour market prospects.  Moreover, family composition and whether the person is the 
family’s main wage earner are also likely to influence individual’s decision to participate in a 
program. 
  
We also include variables that capture the local labour market conditions.  These 
variables measure the different employment opportunities in the judets.  In addition, since 
differences in labour market conditions may favour a different mix of program and 
unemployment policies, these variables are also a proxy for different policy approaches across 
counties.   
 
Finally,  we include county dummies to capture unobserved local aspects that are 
likely to be correlated with program implementation and utilization, or local offices’ 
placement policies, and thus relevant for program-joining decisions and individuals’ potential 
labour market performance.   
 
Although at first sight and relative to studies conducted in developped countries, these 
data may not seem suficiently rich to observe all relevant factors, we believe that our data is 
unusually rich for studies conducted in transition economies—see Kluve, Lehmann and 
Schmidt , 1999, or Earle and Pauna, 1996, among others, for discussion on the poor quality of 
ALMPs’ data in transition economies.  For instance, one could argue that, even though we 
control for employment and unemployment history during 1998, we lack of this type of 
information prior to 1998 (Heckman and Smith, 1999, point to the importance of controlling 
for employment dynamics prior to program participation.)  Rich data on employment 
dynamics prior to program participation in studies on transition economies is unusual.  Many 
of these studies do not have any employment information prior to participation (Lubyova and  
Van Ours, 1999, Puhani and Steiner, 1997, and Vodopivec, 1999, among others).  Others have 
limited information on employment history prior to participation.  For instance, while 
O’Leary et al., 1998, have information on prior employment status and whether the individual 
was a long-term unemployed, they do not control for months employed or unemployed prior 
to program participation.  A study that has information on the length of unemployment spell 
that took place right before program participation is Terrel and Sorm’s JCE 1999 paper.   
However, their information is limited to the year of participants’ unemployment registration, 
which is, at most, the year prior to program entrance, and more often than not, the same year 
of program participation.  Finally, to our knowledge, Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt, 1999 and 
2001, have the most thourough information on employment dynamics prior to participation in 
transition economies, and again, this information is limited to twelve months prior to entering 
the program. 
 
Moreover, we have information on 1998 earnings, which can be considered a proxy 
for both workers’ pre-displacement job characteristics and workers’ motivation, ability and 
soft skills.  Again, while baseline earnings data may be frequently available in developped 
countries, they are less common in transition economies’ studies.  The only study that we 
identified that controlled for baseline earnings data was Terrel and Sorm’s, 1999.
15   
 
Finally, although we lack information on the willingness of the Employment Bureau 
staff of the different local offices to assign people into different programs, we control for 
several county characteristics that most likely capture most of these local differences.  Again, 
while many evaluation studies in developped countries have information local labor offices’ 
willingness to assign people into different programs, we were unable to find any study on 
ALMPs in transition economies that had this type of information.   
 
  Summarizing, the available data include much, but not all, information on factors, 
which affect the selection and the outcomes.  The crucial question—that is left to the reader to 
decide—is whether there is sufficient information to justify the conditional independence 
assumption.  However, we believe that our data frequently provides variables that contain 
some of this needed key information, and is at least qualitatively equal (if not superior) to data 





We selected four comparison groups (one for each of the four groups of ALMPs 
participants)  from the sample of potential comparison group members. 
 
We used propensity scores to select comparison groups for each treatment group, 
according to the following three steps.  First, we estimated a probit model separately for each 
                                                 
15 O’Leary et al., 1998, had information on net monthly household earnings, although it is unclear whether this 
information was used to control for selection bias.   
  
ALMP. We included the following variables in the probit models: male; age indicators; 
education indicators; earnings in 1998; 1998 experience (and its square); unemployed at least 
nine months in 1998; length of unemployment during 1998 (and its square); only employed 
during 1998; received training during 1998; 1998 judet unemployment rate; region’s size; and 
regional indicators.  Table 6 displays the estimation results of the four different binary probits 
and provides a more exact description of the variables used in the analysis.  
 
Second, we used the output from these selection models to estimate choice 
probabilities conditional on X (the so-called propensity scores) for each treatment and 
potential comparison group member.  We then imposed the common-support requirement to 
guarantee that there is an overlap between the propensity scores for each pair (see column 9 of 
Table 7 for number of treated observations lost due to this requirement). 
 
Third, for each treatment group member, we selected potential comparison group 
members based on their propensity scores and their judet.  The selection process was done 
with replacement, so that a potential comparison group member could have been matched to 
more than one treatment group member.
16  In addition, the selection method used was kernel-
based matching, which uses all of the comparison units within a predefined propensity score 
radius (or “caliper of 1%”).  When there were multiple matches, each non-participant received 




Similarity of the Treatment and Comparison Groups 
Our goal was to select, for each of the four groups, a well-matched comparison group.  
A comparison group is well matched to a treatment if the estimated propensity score and the 
collection of available baseline characteristics are not significantly different across the two 
groups. 
 
The results in Table 7 show statistical information on the quality of the match for each 
of the four ALMPs.  Columns 4 and 5 give an indication of how well baseline covariates 
explain the participants’ probability before (column 4) and after (column 5) the match.  Not 
surprisingly, after the match the R
2 decreases considerably.  Similarly, the P-value of the 
likelihood ratio test after matching shows that the null hypothesis of  joint significance of 
regressors is always rejected after the matching (column 6).  The median bias after the 
matching is also considerably reduced (columns 7 and 8). 
 
Overall, results in Table 7 show that matching on the estimated propensity score 
balances the X’s in the matched samples extremely well (and better than the other versions of 
                                                 
16 Matching with replacement minimizes the propensity-score distance between the matched comparison units 
and the treatment unit: each treatment unit can be matched to the nearest comparison unit, even if a comparison 
unit is matched more than once.  This is beneficial in terms of bias reduction, but may reduce the precision of the 
estimates.  An additional advantage of matching with replacement instead of without replacement is that the 
results are not sensitive to the order in which the treatment units are matched (Rosenbaum, 1995).  
17 By using more comparison units, one increases the precision of the estimates, but at the cost of increased bias.  
matching we experimented with).  To adjust for the additional sources of variability 
introduced by the estimation of the propensity score as well as by the matching process itself, 
bootstrapped confidence intervals have been calculated. 
 
 
 VI. Program  Impacts 
 
Measurement of Labour Market Outcomes 
 
Because the primary objective of these policies is to get displaced workers back to 
work in jobs, at least implicitly, as good as the previous one, our analysis focuses in two types 
of outcomes: those that measure workers’ reemployment probabilities and those that measure 
workers’ earnings at the new job.  Moreover, since our survey included retrospective 
questions, we measure these outcomes at two different points in time: at the time of the 
survey, and during the two-year period prior to the survey, that is, during the years 2000 and 
2001. 
 
In addition to measuring employment experience with employment and average usual 
monthly earnings at the time of the survey, we compute two variables that measure the 
reemployment probability for a period of at least 6 and 12 months, respectively, during the 
years 2000 and 2001.  These two variables provide additional information on workers’ 
reemployment experiences over the two-year period prior to the survey, and inform us on the 
workers’ employment attachment over that period.  We also include average usual monthly 
earnings during the two-year period prior to the survey as a proxy for worker’s productivity.
18  
Finally, we include duration of the unemployment spell and months receiving unemployment 
benefits (UB) during the two-year period 2000-2001.  Table 8 describes the outcomes of 
interest and Table 9 summarizes these outcomes by treatment status.   
 
 
Mean Effects of the Programmes for their Participants  
    
    Impacts were estimated as the difference in average outcomes between the treatment and 
the comparison group, and are shown in Table 10.  They are summarized below.   
 
  Employment and Relocation Services.   
   First, we find that ER was successful in improving participants’ economic outcomes 
compared to non-participants in all dimensions.  ER had a positive impact both on current 
employment and on employment during the years 2000-2001.  For instance, it increase the 
probability of being employed at the time of the survey by 8.45 percentage points, which 
represents a 20% increase in the likelihood of being employed at the time of the survey.
19  
Partly as a result of its positive impacts on employment, the program reduced the number of 
                                                 
18 All earnings variables are deflated by gross domestic product (base=1998), and coded as zero if person 
reported not working at the time of the survey. 
19 This result is calculated by dividing the ATET estimate (in this case, 8.45) by the percent of matched non-
participants employed at the time of the survey, which is 42.83 percent.  
months unemployed and receiving UB during the 2000-2001.  Finally, ER had a positive 
impact on earnings: it increased average current monthly earnings by 57 thousand lei (or 
22%) and average monthly earnings during 2000-2001 by 87 thousand lei (or 28%) compared 
to the earnings of non-participants. 
  
    We identified four studies that evaluated job search assistance and related employment 
services in transition economies.  These studies took place in the Czeck Republic (Terrell and 
Sorm, 1999), Macedonia (World Bank, 2002), Hungary and Poland (O’Leary, 1998a).   
Similar to our findings, all of these studies found positive impacts of ER type of services on 
improving employment prospects of participants.  However, of the two evaluations that 





    We also find that SE improved its participants’ employment prospects.  More 
specifically, SE increased by 8.38 percentage points (or 12%) the likelihood of being 
employed for 6 months during the two-year period 2000-2001.  This programme also reduced 
the number of months participants were on average unemployed compared to non-participants 
by almost two months, and the number of months receiving UB payments by almost one 
month.  However, we did not find that SE increased the average monthly earnings of its 
participants relative to non-participants.  This lack of result could be explained by 
entrepreneurs under-reporting their earnings. 
  
    We identified three studies that evaluated self-employment assistance programs in the 
following transition countries: Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and Dorenbos, 2001), 
Hungary and Poland (O’Leary, 1998a).  Consistent with our results, the three programs 
increased the probability of reemployment.  However, the evidence on earnings is mixed.  
While our study found no effect on earnings, the study from Hungary found a negative effect, 
while the study from Poland found a positive one.  The Bulgarian program did not estimate 
the impact of the program on earnings.     
  
Training and Retraining  
    We find that TR has a positive and large impact on the average usual monthly earnings 
perceived during 2000-2001: it increased the earnings of participants by 165 thousand lei 
relative to the earnings of non-participants.  This is equivalent to 58% higher earnings than 
non-participants.  TR also had an impact on the length of UB receipt, by making it practically 
non-existent on average among its participants (see Table 9).  Unfortunately, due to the small 
sample size of our sample of TR participants, we lack precision for the other estimates.   
However, the size of these estimates is consistent with TR being successful in improving 
participants’ economic outcomes compared to non-participants.   
 
    We identified ten different studies that have evaluated training programs aimed at the 
unemployed in transition economies.  Such TR programs have taken  place in Bosnia and 
                                                 
20 The evaluation conducted in Hungary in the mid-1990s found no impact on earnings.  
Herzegovina (Benus, Rude, and Patrabansh, 2001), Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and 
Dorenbos, 2001), Hungary (Gill and Dar, 1995, and O’Leary 1995a), Macedonia (World 
Bank, 2002), Poland (Kluve, Schmidt and Lehmann, 1999, Kluve Lehman and Schmidt, 2002, 
Puhani 1998, O’Leary, 1998b), and Slovak Republic (Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999).  These 
evaluations consistently find that training programs for unemployed workers improve 
participants’ employment prospects in the short-term.  These results are in line with our 
findings, which point to positive (although insignificant) estimates on employment prospects, 
and positive and significant impact on earnings and on unemployment insurance receipt.  
 
Public Employment Programs 
In contrast, we find that the PE program had a negative impact on employment, and 
length of unemployment spell during the past two years.  These detrimental effects are usually 
explained by one or a combination of the following two explanations.  First, participating in 
PE may be ineffective insofar as it does not rebuild human capital, boost search efforts or 
improve the image of the long-term unemployed individual.   Second, participation in PE is a 
negative signal to the employer (Lehmann, 1995). 
 
We identified the following eleven studies that evaluated public employment 
programs in transition economies: Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and Dorenbos, 2001), 
Hungary (O’Leary, 1995, and O’Leary, 1998(a)) Macedonia (World Bank, 2002b), Poland 
(Kluve, Schmidt and Lehmann, 1999, Kluve Lehman and Schmidt, 2002, Puhani 1998, 
O’Leary, 1998b), Slovak Republic (Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999), Slovenia (Vodopivec, 
1999), and Ukraine (Olga, 2000).  Overall, the results were mixed.  While two evaluations in 
Poland concluded, as in our study, that PE had a significant negative effect on exiting 
unemployment and future employment.  Evaluations in Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine found that a positive employment effect disappeared if the worker did not find a job 
immediately after the program ended, suggesting that employers may be using PE as a 
screening device before committing to formal employment.  Finally, a small positive impact 
on employment was found in Bulgaria.  However, this positive result was small compared to 
other ALMPs, and was achieved at a high unit cost. 
 
 
VII.  Heterogeneity and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section we explore the robustness of the results presented above.  We first 
examine the sensitivity of the results to various estimators.  Second, we examine 
heterogeneity among various types of individuals. 
 
Sensitivity of the results to various estimators 
    One way to check the robustness of the results, is to apply various estimators to the 
same problem to see whether the results differ. We compared the results obtained by matching 
to some alternative estimators.  Tables 11 through 14 present impact estimates for the effect 
of the ALMPs on various employment outcomes and earnings in Romania using four 
alternative estimators.  The first set of results (first column of Tables 11 through 14) is gross 
impact estimates, which were not adjusted for observable differences between the participant  
and non-participants, that is, we use our whole sample of non-participants regardless of 
whether their baseline characteristics resembled to those of  participants.  The second set of 
results (second column of Tables 11 through 14) is net impact estimates, which were adjusted 
for demographic and regional differences, and earnings, employment, unemployment and 
training experiences in 1998 using multivariate ordinary least squares regression (when the 
dependent variable was continuous) or probit regression (when the dependent variable was a 
binary variable).  The covariates included in the OLS and the probit estimations are the same 
as those used to estimates the propensity scores in Table 10 and column 4 of Table 11.  The 
third set of results are net impact estimates that were computed as simple differences between 
the mean outcome of interest for the participant group and the mean outcome for a non-
experimentally matched comparison group selected by the same propensity score method 
described in section V, however, we did not use any of the pre-earnings, pre-employment, and 
pre-unemployment history to match participants to non-participants.  The fourth set of results 
are the estimators presented in section VI and Table 10. 
 
    The most obvious overall result in Table 10 through 14 is that the unadjusted impact 
estimates (column 1) are generally different from the other estimates (columns 2 through 4).  
For TR, SB and ER, the unadjusted impact estimates were better than the other ones, 
suggesting that operators may “cream off” the most qualified candidates among the 
unemployed for these particular types of programs.  This finding is consistent with other 
analyses of ALMP in transition economies (O’Leary,1998 and Kluve, Lehmann, and Schmidt, 
2001, among others).    In contrast, adjusting for observable characteristics reduces the 
detrimental employment and unemployment impact estimates on PE (Table 13).  In particular, 
the sensitivity of the results to the availability of different covariates—not shown here, but 
available from the author upon request—indicates that information on the regional location of 
participants and non-participants was essential when measuring this program’s impacts, 
suggesting that programs like public employment may be used as a regional policy by 
“bringing work to the workers”, that is, creating job in high unemployment regions.   
 
    Comparing the gross impact estimates with the regression-adjusted estimates (column 
1 versus column 2) clearly reduces the positive impact of SE estimates and the negative 
impact of PE estimates, reflecting that there is an over-representation of individuals with 
“better” observable characteristics in the group of SE participants and an over-representation 
of individuals with “worse” observable characteristics in the group of PE participants.  In the 
case of TR, we find that regression-adjusting the estimates reduces the positive effect of TR 
on current employment and earning outcomes, and increases it on employment and earnings 
outcomes over the last two years.  Finally, regression-adjusting the estimates has little effect 
on ER findings, leaving most estimates unchanged.  The two exceptions are average monthly 
earning perceived over the two year period 2000-2001 and months unemployed, for which 
adjusting for observables raises the positive effect.  
 
    Comparing columns 2 and 4 provides us with a comparison between results obtained 
by matching with the standard OLS regression for the continuous dependent variables, and a 
probit model for the discrete dependent variables.  As in the matching approach, identification 
of the average treatment effects in these models requires conditional independence.    
Moreover, the estimators are based on further parametric restrictions. 
 
    We observe substantial differences between the OLS and probit estimators on the one 
hand, and matching on the other for the cases of TR, ER, and PE.  For TR and ER, we find 
that the results obtained by matching reduce the positive employment effects of TR and SE. 
Whereas for PE we find that the matching estimates reflect a smaller negative impact on 
employment outcomes for participants—the negative impact disappears in the case of 
outcomes measuring current employment and earnings.  These differences are presumably 
explained by the parametric restrictions underlying the OLS and probit estimations.  Matching 
allows for heterogeneity in the treatment effect in a more flexible way. 
 
    Comparing estimates from column 3 and 4 enable us to explore the importance of 
controlling for pre-earnings, pre-employment, and pre-unemployment history. We find that 
these variables are very essential when measuring the effect of the different programs, as 
reflected by the fact that excluding them raises the size of impact estimates of all programs.  
 
 
Heterogeneity among Types of Individuals  
    So far we have considered the average effects for the participants in the different 
programmes.  Since participants are heterogeneous, there may be differences in how the 
programmes affect different types of individuals.  Therefore, we stratify the sample along the 
dimensions unemployment duration, type of region, age, education, and gender, and match 
within strata.  Below, we summarize the key findings (all subgroup estimates are displayed in 
Tables 15 through 18). 
 
    Clearly, the most substantial (and significant) differences occur with respect to age, 
type of region, and unemployment duration prior to participation for the ER programme.  
These differences are displayed in Table 18.  We find that ER improves economic outcomes 
of participating for younger workers, workers with histories of short-term unemployment, and 
those living in rural areas compared to older workers, those with histories of long-term 
unemployment, and those living in urban areas, respectively.   
  
    We also find relevant subgroup differences across individuals participating in SE.  In 
particular, we find that SE is more successful for females than for males, for workers without 
a high-school diploma than for those with, and for workers living in rural areas compared to 
those in urban areas. 
 
    Even though we find that PE seems to have a positive  effect on the employment 
probability and the earnings of participants living in rural areas at the time of the survey, this 
result does not hold when employment and earnings outcomes are measured during the period 
2000-2001.  Thus, this positive effect of PE in rural areas is most likely explained by 
participants re-entering PE once the requisite that “participants do not participate in more than 
one ALMP during a 24 months period” is satisfied.   
 
  Although, we did not find any statistically significant different impacts of training and  
retraining for different subgroups, this is likely due to the lack of precision due to small sub-
sample sizes.   
 
VIII.  Cost-Benefit Analysis and Conclusion 
  
    The purpose of this study has been to analyse the effects of four ALMPs implemented 
in Romania during the late 1990s.  Our analysis is based on data from a follow-up survey 
especially designed for this study.  We use nonparametric matching estimators to control for 
potential selection bias.  Our analysis of program impacts reveals that three of the four 
programs (TR, SE and ER) had success in improving participants' economic outcomes.  In 
contrast, our analysis reveals that PE was found detrimental for the employment prospects of 
its participants.   
  
    Even though this analysis has shown significant positive impacts of TR, SE, and ER 
programmes implemented in Romania in the late 1990s, the question remains as to whether 
these three ALMPs were cost-effective from society’s perspective.
21  While there is some 
scattered data on costs, the cost-benefit issue has rarely been addressed.
22  Hence we now 
compare the costs per client of the ALMP with the economic benefits, as reflected in 
predicted earnings. 
 
We estimate the average cost per client served by dividing the total amount spent in 
each ALMP by the number of clients served.  Table 2 displays these estimates. The cost per 
client served is 541.07 thousand lei for TR, 179.15 thousand lei for SE, and 123.74 thousand 
lei for ER. 
 
To estimate the benefits of the policy, we use the estimated impact of these ALMPs on 
the usual average monthly earnings of their participants.  We prefer using the earnings 
estimates over the 2000-2001 period because they are more likely to represent individuals’ 
earnings than those observed at one point in time.  This amounts to an annual sum of   
5,393.04 thousand lei for TR, 4,783.20 thousand lei for SE (although this estimate was not 
statistically significant), and  1,047.84 thousand lei for ER, which cover by far the cost per 
client served.  Therefore, these three policies are definitively cost-effective.
23   
 
A caveat in our cost-benefit analysis is that we did not include among potential 
benefits: (1) possible effects on labour market behaviour of the unemployed prior to 
participation, such as, intensifying job search before entering the programmes in order to 
avoid participation, or leaving the labour force and stop collecting UB; (2) reduced criminal 
                                                 
21 When measuring cost-effectiveness from society’s perspective, we measure whether aggregate benefits from 
implementing the policy are greater than the aggregate resources spent by the policy, abstracting from who 
enjoys its benefits and who bears its costs.  Thus, under this perspective, increases in taxes paid due to the 
increased employment of participants or reductions in public assistance of participants are not counted as they 
are transfers from participants to the rest of society. 
22 This is particularly true for studies in transition economies. 
23 Given that benefits that accrue within the observation period are above the costs, we did not use a long-term 
perspective to estimate cost-effectiveness.   
  
activity due to improved employment prospects; (3) improvements in the quality of life for 
participants and their families, (4) savings in the deadweight losses due to reduced taxes 
required to pay participants’ future unemployment benefits. Another caveat is that we did not 
considered in this analysis the following potentially important costs: (1) the deadweight loss 
of taxation to finance benefits, subsidies, and operation of programmes; (2) the cost of the 
leisure forgone while participants are in the program or employed; and (3) possible 
displacement effects of non-subsidized workers.  However, given that the measured benefits 
far exceed the costs of the programmes, we are confident that, at least the SE and ER, 
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Table 1 
 
Characteristics of ALMPs 
 




Public Employment  Employment and 
Relocation Services 




literacy, and formal 
business skills 
training 
Initial assessment of 
the aptitude and skills 
of unemployed 
persons to start 
businesses, 
developing business 
plans, advising on 
accounting, financial, 
legal, marketing and 
sales services issues, 
assistance in the 
dialogue with local 
authorities, short-term 
entrepreneurial 
courses and training 








and provision of 
assistance and support 
to social agencies, 
such as schools, or 
retirement homes 
Job and social 
counseling, labor 
market information, 







Up to nine months  No general rule, up to 
12 months 




was at the minimum 
wage level and for a 
period equal to the 
difference between 
the months of 
unemployment 
benefits and months 
of training 
There were provisions 
for short-term 
working capital loans 
of up to $25,000 U.S. 
dollars to program 
participants 
Stipend was set at a 
maximum of the 
average wage level of 
the type of activity 
provided and for the 
duration of the 
program 
Up to two months of 
salary at the 
minimum wage.   
In addition, those 
clients receiving 
relocation assistance 
could be reimbursed 
for expenses 
associated with 
moving to another 
community—up to 
$500 U.S. dollars 
equivalent in lei per 
family, based on 
submission of 
receipts.   
Target group  Persons exposed to 




intended to start, or 
who had started 
businesses during the 






of at least: 
60 percent  5 percent  10 percent  10 percent 
a In practice, the length of these programs was considerably shorter than the established maximum duration. 
Source: USDOL Technical Assistance Support Team.  
Table 2 
 
Eligible Costs and Limits of Reimbursement for Service Providers 
 




Public Employment  Employment and 
Relocation Services 
Eligible costs  Eligible costs 
included cost of 
training and 
administrative 






up to 20 percent per 
year.   
Eligible costs included 
personnel services, 
transportation costs, 
rent and utilities, 
consumable materials 
and non-durable 
goods, and capital 
depreciation up to 20 
percent per year. 
These public works 
projects covered the 
cost of supervisory 
personnel and up to 6 
months of program 
participants’ 




related training costs, 
utilities, and 
consumable and non-
durable goods.   
Eligible costs 
included staff and 
administrative 




transportation for job 
interviews, non-
durable goods, and 
depreciation of 
capital equipment up 
to 20 percent per 




The cost of training 
was limited to $560 
U.S. dollars per class 
unit.   
Costs per client had to 
be specified in all 
contracts, however 
unit costs could be 
identified for different 
categories of services 
by each service 
provider based on the 
understanding that all 
clients did not need 
full services and some 
may drop out after 
initial contacts.  
Reimbursement to 
service providers was 
based on the 
contracted average 




organizations had to 
provide evidence of 
administrative and 
financial viability.  
Local governments 
and other eligible 
organizations could 
propose public works 
projects with a 
maximum cost of 
$50,000 U.S. dollars 
(or higher with a no-
objection from the 
World Bank).   
 





Completed ALMP contracts as of September 1, 2001 
 






















92 20,293.00  3,568 17.58%  3,635,562,636.30  179,153.53  1,018,935.72 
Public 





88 31,679.00  6,610  20.87%  3,920,060,312.43  123,743.18  593,049.97 
Costs figures have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
Source: USDOL Technical Assistance Support Team.  
Table 4 
 
Baseline Demographic and Regional Characteristics of   
ALMP Participants and Non-Participants, 1998 





















Characteristics       
Personal characteristics 
Male  45.83        50.69     89.89     45.92     63.82     
Age       
Less than 31 years old  5.56     4.99     13.03     7.50     8.93    
Between 31 and 35 years old  27.78     22.71     19.33      14.59     16.46    
Between 36 and 45 years old  47.22     40.44     38.43     40.16     36.58    
Between 45 and 50 years old  15.28     17.73     18.20     20.62     19.79    
More than 50 years old  4.17     14.13     11.01     17.14     18.25    
Education completed       
Primary school   5.56     9.97     21.12  13.25  14.86 
Secondary school  63.89   32.41  56.85     45.92    44.30    
High school  27.78     37.67     18.65     28.65   29.31    
University  2.78 19.45 3.71 12.82  11.26 
Family characteristics 










Main family earner  38.89 42.38 55.06 44.31 46.04 
Regional information 
Region       
 Rural   8.33  5.82  35.06 11.24 17.92 
Urban with less than 20 
thousand inhabitants  18.06 35.46 19.10 18.34 18.45 
Urban with 20 - 79 thousand 
inhabitants   16.67 14.13 39.10 20.08 28.11 
Urban with 80 - 199 thousand 
inhabitants   27.78 27.15  5.39  39.89 25.98 
Urban with 200 thousand 
inhabitants  29.17  17.45 1.35 10.44 9.53 
Judet’s unemployment rate  10.67     11.37     15.76     11.86     13.12    
       
       
Sample size  72 362  445  747  1,501 




Baseline Employment Characteristics of   
ALMP Participants and Non-Participants, 1998 





















Characteristics       
Work Experience 










1998 Employment status 
Not employed in 1998  45.83     23.82     59.10     22.36     19.19     
Employed in 1998  54.17     76.18     40.90     77.64     80.81     
Employed between 1 and 3 
months in 1998 
4.17  1.39  5.62   4.42     2.53 
Employed between 4 and 6 
months in 1998 
12.5     6.37     16.85   8.70    7.40   
Employed between 7 and 9 
months in 1998 
4.17    3.05     8.09   10.71   5.53    
Employed between 9 and 12 
months in 1998 
33.33   65.37   10.34  53.82   65.36  
Not employed in 1998  45.83     23.82     59.10     22.36     19.19     
1998 usual monthly earnings 
Earnings per month       
Under 500 thousand lei   1.39 4.43 4.94 5.22 3.00 
500 - 600 thousand lei   9.72 3.05 2.02 5.22 4.46 
601 - 700 thousand lei   2.78 5.82 5.82 9.64 7.13 
701 - 850 thousand lei   6.94 13.02 6.74 14.19  12.26 
851 - 1,000 thousand lei   12.5 10.80 5.39 15.66  14.72 
1,001 - 1,200 thousand lei   9.72  13.30 12.58 13.79 14.06 
1,201 - 1,500 thousand lei   6.94 13.30 3.60  7.36 10.79 
1,501 - 1,900 thousand lei   2.78 5.54 1.13 3.88 6.79 
1,901 - 2,500 thousand lei   1.39 4.16 0.45 1.20 5.40 
More than 2,500  thousand lei  0  2.77 0.45 1.47 2.20 
Average monthly earnings  
(in thousand lei) 
522.92   
(65.25) 
881.72    
(39.38) 
384.16    
(25.64) 
758.07   
(22.51) 
926.60   
(17.88) 
Unemployment experience in 1998 
Average unemployment length 
during 1998 (months) 
6.26    
(0.58) 
3.38   
  (0.25) 
8.75    
(0.19) 
3.90    
(0.17) 
2.99    
(0.11) 
Unemployed at least 9 months 
during 1998  45.83     23.27     60.67     23.56     18.85    
Training experience in 1998 
Received training during 1998  18.06   8.86     4.04     6.69      3.13    
Average training length during 
1998 (months) 
0.68   
(0.19) 




0.26   
(0.05) 
0.10    
(0.02) 
Sample size  72 362  445  747  1,501 
Standard deviation in parenthesis for continuous variables.  
Table 6 















Characteristics        
Male  .1713 
(.1948181) 
-.2015284  





















Education completed        
























Persons in the household        








































Region        



























































Table 6  (Continued) 















Characteristics        



































Average earnings per month in 1998  

















































































































Sample size  768 1,326 1,829 1,775 
All regressions include county dummies.  Pseudo R

















































retraining  72  696  10.34 0.368  0.035 0.850 27.24  5.69  11 
Self-Employment 
Assistance  362  964  37.55 0.162  0.013 0.985 11.31  2.29  12 
Public service 
employment  445  1,384  32.15 0.359  0.013 0.996 24.64  1.87  6 
Employment and 
relocation services  747 1,028 72.67  0.174  0.017  0.533 9.36 2.88  4 
(1)  Number of treated, that is, joining an ALMP program in 1999. 
(2)  Number of potential comparisons, that is, persons who had registered at the Employment Bureau in 1999 but did not participate in an ALMP. 
(3)  Treated as a percentage of potential comparisons. 
(4) Pseudo-R
2 from probit estimation of the joining probability on X, giving an indication of how well the regressors X explain the participants probability. 
(5), (6), (7), and (10) are postmatching indicators on kernel-based matching (1 % caliper). 
(5) Pseudo-R
2 from probit estimation of the joining probability on X on the matched samples.   
(6)  P-value of the likelihood ratio test after matching.  After matching, the joint significance of the regressors is always rejected.  Before matching, , the joint 
significance of the regressors was never rejected at any significance level, with Pr > X
2= 0.0000. 
(7), and (8)   Median absolute standardized bias before and after matching, median taken over all regressors X.  Following Rosembaum and Rubin (1985), for a given 
covariate X, the standardized difference before matching is the difference of the sample means in the full treated and nontreated subsamples as a percentage of the 
square root of the average of the sample variances in the full treated and nontreated groups.  The standardized difference after matching is the difference of the 
sample means in the matched treated, that is, the common support, and matched nontreated subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the full nontreated groups:  
 
() () [] 2 /
. 100 ) (
0 1
0 1





≡   and 
() () [] 2 /
. 100 ) (
0 1
0 1








Note that the standardization allows comparisons between variables X and, for a given X, comparisons before and after matching. 
(9)  Number of treated individuals falling outside of the common support (based on a caliper of 1 %).   32
Table 8 
 
Description of outcome variables 
 
Variables Definition 
At the time of the survey 
Employed  Person was employed at the time of the survey (dummy variable) 
Average monthly earnings   Average monthly earnings at the time of the survey 
During the two year period 2000-2001 
Employed at least 6 months  Person has been employed for at least 6 months during the period 
2000-2001 (dummy variable) 
Employed at least 12 months  Person has been employed for at least 12 months during the period 
2000-2001 (dummy variable) 
Months unemployed   Number of months the person has been unemployed during the period 
2000-2001  
Months receiving UB payments  Number of months the person has been registered with the Public 
Employment Services and receiving unemployment benefits payment 
during the period 2000-2001 
Average monthly earnings  Average monthly earnings during the two-year period 2000-2001 
Note: Earnings are deflated by gross domestic product (base=1998). Earnings are coded as zero if person 
reported not working at the time of the survey. 
   33
Table 9 
 
Outcomes for ALMP Participants 










OUTCOMES       
Current experience         
Employed  57.81 50.86 31.74  51.28 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei)  311.76 303.28 160.96  309.64 
       
During the two year period 2000-2001         
Employed for at least 6 months  75.00 78.86 48.17  78.87 
Employed for at least 12 months  65.62 59.71 33.56  63.39 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei)  449.42 398.60 256.12  394.34 
Months unemployed   9.52 10.36  16.22  9.45 
Months receiving UB payments  0.06 1.44 1.78  0.79 
       
Sample size  72 362  445  747 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
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Table 10 
 
Average Treatment Effects of Programmes on the Employment Experience of their Participants, by ALMPs 






Assistance Public  Employment  
Employment and 
Relocation 
OUTCOMES      
Current experience         
Employed  12.47 
( -7..00; 29.54 ) 
6.14   
(-0.44   12.29 ) 
0.61 
(-6.07; 6.29 ) 
8.45 
(3.19; 13.90 ) 
 
 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 
65.67 
( -76.45; 177.64 ) 
37.58 
(-13.25;  80.12 ) 
3.10 
( -33.87; 33.44 ) 
56.86 
(1 0.49; 109.51) 
      
During the two year period 2000-2001         
Employed for at least 6 months  2.53 
(-10.55; 27.28) 
8.38 
(2.29; 14.13)   
-7.36 
( -14.98; -0.75 ) 
6.22 
( 2.35 ; 13.52 )    





( -15.41  -1.40 )   
7.65 
( 2.11 ; 13.73 ) 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei)  164.81 
( 63.09; 362.20 ) 
43.08 
(-9.48; 87.58 ) 
-6.65 
( -47.29; 30.33 ) 
87.32 
( 56.99; 130.21 ) 
Months unemployed   -1.66 
( -4.91; 2.79 ) 
-1.82 
( -3.00  -0.54 ) 
1.95 
( 0.66;  3.21 ) 
-1.90 
( -3.15 ; -0.9 2) 
Months receiving UB payments  -1.01 




( -0.60;  0.93 ) 
-0.74 
(-1.18 ; -0.29 )   
Sample  size  768  1,311 1,445 1,748 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
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Table 11 
 
Impacts of Training and Retraining Services 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
  PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS 
PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to 
non-participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES      
Current experience         





(4.32; 28.34 )  
12.47 
( -7.00; 29.54 ) 
 








( -76.45; 177.64 ) 
      
During the two year period 2000-2001         























( 63.09; 362.20 ) 







( -4.91; 2.79 ) 




-1.93   
(-2.77; -1.28) 
-1.01 
( -2.24; -0.53 ) 
Sample size  1,573  1,573  741  768 
Sample size of the treatment group   72  72  70  61 
Sample size of the comparison group  1,501  1,501  671  553 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  
Table 12 
 
Impacts of Self-Employment Assistance Program 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
  PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS 
PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to 
non-participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES      
Current experience         






6.14   
(-0.44   12.29 ) 
 





40.67   
(-6.56; 84.21) 
37.58 
(-13.25;  80.12 ) 
      
During the two year period 2000-2001         




10.27   
(3.91; 15.50) 
8.38 
(2.29; 14.13)   












40.29   
(-10.36; 82.64) 
43.08 
(-9.48; 87.58 ) 







( -3.00  -0.54 ) 








Sample  size  1,863 1,863 1,318 1,311 
Sample size of the treatment group   362  362  358  350 
Sample size of the comparison group  1,501  1,501  960  961 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  
Table 13 
 
Impacts of Public Employment Services 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
  PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS 
PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to 
non-participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES      
Current experience         







(-6.07; 6.29 ) 
 





-34.66   
(-70.70; -4.48) 
3.10 
( -33.87; 33.44 ) 
      
During the two year period 2000-2001         




-13.12   
(-19.76; -7.68) 
-7.36 
( -14.98; -0.75 ) 




-13.06   
(-19.38; -7.47) 
-8.45 
( -15.41  -1.40 ) 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei)  -63.03 
(16.99) 
-11.53 
(17.36)   
-45.58    
(-80.38; -9.37) 
-6.65 
( -47.29; 30.33 ) 







( 0.66;  3.21 ) 







( -0.60;  0.93 ) 
Sample  size  1,947 1,947 1,714 1,445 
Sample size of the treatment group   445  445  445  439 
Sample size of the comparison group  1,501  1,501  1,269  1,006 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  
Table 14 
 
Impacts of Employment and Relocation Services 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
  PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS 
PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to 
non-participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES      
Current experience         







(3.19; 13.90 ) 
 





56.32   
(11.92; 97.90) 
56.86 
(1 0.49; 109.51) 
      
During the two year period 2000-2001         




9.07   
(4.66; 13.18) 
6.22 
( 2.35 ; 13.52 ) 




11.24    
(6.29; 15.43) 
7.65 
( 2.11 ; 13.73 ) 




62.37   
(25.48; 92.84) 
87.32 
( 56.99; 130.21 ) 







( -3.15 ; -0.9 2) 





(-1.87; -.91)  
-0.74 
(-1.18 ; -0.29 ) 
Sample  size  2,248 2,248 1,724 1,748 
Sample size of the treatment group   747  747  746  743 
Sample size of the comparison group  1,501  1,501  978  1,005 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.   39
Table 15 
 
Average treatment effects of Training and Retraining Services according to different socio-demographic characteristics 


















>5 months  Rural   Urban 
OUTCOMES                   
Current experience                     













    
5.32 
  n.a. 3.07 
Average wage  











  n.a. 13.18 
                    
During the two year period 2000-2001 

















  n.a. -6.92     

















  n.a. 4.73 
Average wage  

































        -2.85 
  n.a. -1.53 

















  n.a. -0.83* 
Sample size  192  105  62  265  273  49  190  72  n.a.  375 
Sample size of the 
treatment group   27 27 16  38  41  14  26  19  n.a.  46 
Sample size of the 
comparison group  165 78  46  227  232  35  164  53  n.a.  329 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
* indicates that estimates are significant at the 5% level.   
9 indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
Note: the number of observations does not necessarily add up to the one in the full sample.  
Table 16 
 
Average treatment effects of Self-Employment Assistance according to different socio-demographic characteristics 


















>5 months  Rural   Urban 
OUTCOMES                   
Current experience                     















  9.90 4.00     
Average wage  











  36.90 42.54 
                    
During the two year period 2000-2001 

















  19.89*9 0.069     

















  19.06*9 5.389 
Average wage  


























  -3.61*9 -0.579  -1.02 
 
-1.55 
  -3.64*9 -1.209 



















  0.369 
Sample size  790  463  273  955  595  687  966  208  427  774 
Sample size of the 
treatment group   181 175  97 254  200  150  244  45  142  210 
Sample size of the 
comparison group  609 288 176  701  395  537  722  163  285  564 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
* indicates that estimates are significant at the 5% level.   
9 indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
Note: the number of observations does not necessarily add up to the one in the full sample.  
Table 17 
 
Average treatment effects of Public Employment according to different socio-demographic characteristics 


















>5 months  Rural   Urban 
OUTCOMES                   
Current experience                     















  10.91*9 -8.999 
Average wage  











  58.30*9 -45.499 
                    
During the two year period 2000-2001 

















  -4.42 -10.55 

















  -6.20 -11.72* 
Average wage  


































  0.959 3.04*9 

















  0.629 -0.509 
Sample size  1,105  127  340  992  901  389  830  331  618  759 
Sample size of the 
treatment group   392 37 133  296  344  96  247  90  236  201 
Sample size of the 
comparison group  713 90 207  696  557  293  583  241  382  558 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
* indicates that estimates are significant at the 5% level.   
9 indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
Note: the number of observations does not necessarily add up to the one in the full sample.  
Table 18 
 
Average treatment effects of Employment and Relocation Services according to different socio-demographic characteristics 


















>5 months  Rural   Urban 
OUTCOMES                   
Current experience                     















  17.93* 6.13* 
Average wage  











   91.54* 47.19 
                    
During the two year period 2000-2001 

















  7.73 3.68* 

















  17.25* 5.09 
Average wage  


































  -4.87*9 -0.969 

















  -1.57* -0.50* 
Sample size  901  804  362  1,365  977  725  1,282  324  454  1,177 
Sample size of the 
treatment group   338 400 159  577  438  296  482  213  189  531 
Sample size of the 
comparison group  563 404 203  788  539  429  1,282  111  265  646 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
* indicates that estimates are significant at the 5% level.   
9 indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
Note: the number of observations does not necessarily add up to the one in the full sample. 